Proof Anchored on chain
Includes the bundle, a printable PDF proof, and a verify guide. Keep alongside the original file.
Include the original file in this package (optional)
Pick the file you anchored. Your browser will re-hash it locally and compare against the anchored fingerprint; the file’s bytes never leave this page. If it matches, it will be bundled into original/ inside the ZIP so recipients have everything in one place.
Keep these two together
Verifying later needs both: your original file and the bundle. The proof commits to the file’s fingerprint, not its bytes — we never had them.
In plain terms. This is tamper-evident proof that whoever anchored it held this file’s fingerprint (its SHA-256) by 2026-05-02T01:11:21Z UTC, recorded on the public BSV chain. Anyone can re-check it without trusting Satsignal — it does not establish authorship, or that the event the file describes actually happened. The full breakdown is below.
Standard proof — file never left your device. Your file was NOT uploaded. Only its SHA-256 hash, file size, and any label you typed were transmitted.
A valid proof establishes the file existed in this exact form at the time of the on-chain transaction. It does not prove:
- that the underlying event the file describes actually happened;
- who produced the file, who saw it, or who signed it;
- what the file means or whether its claims are true.
Technical proof detail — hashes, on-chain commitment, size
- File SHA-256 file fingerprint
062e3571a913d84734302ad270c36bc00f85961190fac486b4b563ecdd690ee9- File size
- 59bytes
- Filename label
- sample.csv
- Anchored at (UTC)
- 2026-05-02T01:11:21ZUTC
- Transaction on-chain record
-
03edfa768bab3795fa3f642ada5d36fe740728c993467c06a455256a4bacb71f - On-chain commitment cryptographic anchor
329b201af8545b26192d3ba311ecf5e9453884e6
Proofs anchored
Three orthogonal proofs about your file are committed in a single on-chain anchor. Use whichever the situation calls for.
- Byte-exact
062e3571a913d84734302ad270c36bc00f85961190fac486b4b563ecdd690ee9- Content-canonical
34e9d2885055a699bdecca4554a368de288963df3bd16e12aa7a07b5081cf0c0- Per-section commitment
56b882a88f6e14eb9aeafaa3df29cf45590905f72f0348bec8cf38ec19bb31e4
Other download options
How to verify this proof yourself (manual recipe)
For an audit trail or scripting, here are
the manual steps anyone can run with sha256sum:
- Re-fetch the on-chain transaction:
https://whatsonchain.com/tx/03edfa768bab3795fa3f642ada5d36fe740728c993467c06a455256a4bacb71f— confirm anOP_RETURNoutput starting with the bytesMBNT. - Decode the OP_RETURN payload: bytes 8–27 are the
doc_hash(sha256 of the canonical proof doc, truncated to 20 bytes; bytes 0–3 areMBNT, 4 the version, 5 the subtype, 6–7 the TLV length). It must match329b201af8545b26192d3ba311ecf5e9453884e6. - Hash the included
canonical.jsonfrom the.mbntbundle directly — the bundle stores the exact bytes that were hashed on-chain, so do not re-canonicalize:sha256sum canonical.json | cut -c1-40. The first 40 hex chars must equal329b201af8545b26192d3ba311ecf5e9453884e6. (If you instead re-canonicalize to defend against a tampered stored copy, you MUST use SCJ-v1 — code-point key sort, NFC, floats forbidden — not RFC 8785 / a generic JCS library: the product uses three non-interchangeable JSON canonicalizers. See the MBNT spec §5.) - Sha256 the original file — must equal the File SHA-256 above. The bundle does not contain the bytes; you kept them.